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LOUIS DE LA FORGE AND THE ‘NON-TRANSFER
ARGUMENT’ FOR OCCASIONALISM1
Andrea Sangiacomo
In this paper, I investigate Louis de La Forge’s argument against body–
body causation. His general strategy exploits the impossibility of bodies
communicating their movement by transfer of motion. I call this the
‘non-transfer’ argument (NT). NT allows La Forge both to reinterpret
continuous creation in an occasionalistic fashion and to support his
non-occasionalistic view concerning mind–body union. First, I
present how NT emerges in Descartes’ own texts. Second, I show
how La Forge recasts it to draw an occasionalistic account of body–
body interactions, and I discuss how La Forge supports NT with
continuous creation. Third, I conclude by suggesting that this further
step of his argument does not undermine his non-occasionalistic
account of mind–body union.
KEYWORDS: continuous creation; occasionalism; mind–body
interactionism; Descartes; La Forge
I am not nothing in the sense of emptiness, but I am the creative nothing, the
nothing out of which I myself as creator create everything.
(Max Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, 7)
THE MONSTROUS HYPOTHESIS
In his Letters to Serena, John Toland claims that his own account of active
matter is the best way to contrast the ‘monstrous hypothesis’ proposed by
several Cartesians to avoid certain difﬁculties in physics:
1I thank Antonella Del Prete, Lisa Downing, Daniel Garber, Adam Jaffee, Delphine Kolesnik-
Antoine, Martin Lenz, Steven Nadler, Lodi Nauta, Tad Schamltz, Emanuela Scribano, Anna
Wilks and some anonymous referees for their important suggestions and helpful discussions
concerning different aspects of this paper. I also thank Ohad Nachtomy for having provided
me with the opportunity to give a ﬁrst presentation of this paper at the New York City Work-
shop in Early Modern Philosophy (Fordham University, February 2013).
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there was no end of Absurditys from false or precarious Systems; Absurditys
so monstrous, that they have driven several of the Cartesians (to name no
others) to as monstrous Hypotheses, when not knowing wherein consisted
the moving Force, and for avoiding the Transition of Accidents from one
Subject to another, they are not asham’d to say, that God takes the Motion
from one Bowl that is running forward (for example) and communicates it
to the other against which it rubs [… ]. Is this to explain any thing?2
(Toland, Letters to Serena, Letter V, §30, 236)
Arguably, the target here is occasionalism, which is the account of caus-
ality according to which a certain cause c can produce the effect e only
through a direct intervention of God in producing e.3 Thus, c is just an
‘occasional’ cause of God’s production of e. However, Toland envisages a
kind of occasionalism that subordinates the appeal for God’s intervention
to the need to avoid the transition of accidents from one subject to
another. Accordingly, in Toland’s view the theological claim concerning
God’s involvement in the physical world results from the need to resolve
a difﬁculty concerning the communication of motion, which is a physical
problem.
Toland’s reaction suggests that this way of establishing occasionalism was
not unusual in his time. Indeed, in 1694 Antoine Le Grand published his An
Entire Body of Philosophy According to the Principles of the Famous Renate
Des Cartes, in which he expressly used the same argument to ground God’s
continuous intervention in physics:
tho’ Motion, as being only the Mode of a Body, cannot remove from one
Subject to another, which Regius unwarily asserts; yet the agitating force,
being no Mode of a Body, may by removing shew it self sometimes in this,
sometimes in the other Body. Whensoever therefore DES CARTES speaks
of the Communication of Motion, he is to be understood of that Power,
which preserves Natural Things in the same condition wherein they were con-
stituted at ﬁrst, and all effects order’d according to the Laws appointed for
them, and suiting to their Natures.4
(Le Grand, Entire Body of Philosophy, IV, ch. 15, 117)
Therefore, when Toland presents the monstrous hypothesis forged by Car-
tesians, he is referring to an argument that was well integrated in Cartesian
2See also Letter IV, §15, 156–7.
3It should be noted that in Letters IV and V, in addition to the Occasionalistic position recalled
here, Toland has also two further targets. The ﬁrst is Descartes himself, who allowed that God
is the ﬁrst and original cause of motion but left the variety of bodies and motion unexplained.
The second is Spinoza, who does not acknowledge that God gave being to motion, and shows
no cause of motion whatsoever. Concerning Toland’s reading of Spinoza and how it is inﬂu-
enced by the problem raised by occasionalism, see Sangiacomo, ‘Dall’origine della supersti-
zione all’origine del movimento’.
4See also Le Grand, Entire Body of Philosophy, IV, ch. 16, 119 and V, ch. 7, 143.





























textbooks of the period.5 Now, the arguments used in the seventeenth
century to support occasionalism are often associated with Malebranche.
Accordingly, other authors who seemed to endorse occasionalism are
treated in terms of sources or reception to Malebranche’s thought (e.g. Fred-
doso ‘God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes’; Yakira, La cau-
salité de Galilée à Kant; Clatterbaugh ‘Cartesian Causality’; Ott, Causation
and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy). However, the argument
attacked by Toland and presented by Le Grand was not among Male-
branche’s arguments.6 Rather, Louis de La Forge was the ﬁrst philosopher
to explicitly centre his occasionalistic account of causation on the impossi-
bility of the transfer of motion, and he attempted to show that such an argu-
ment could be found in Descartes’ own works.
In this paper, I would like to focus on La Forge’s treatment of this ‘non-
transfer’ argument (NT) for occasionalism. This argument has received rela-
tively little attention in the literature devoted to occasionalism. Nonetheless,
I suggest the reasons that warrant a serious investigation of how this argu-
ment works are twofold. First, such an inquiry illuminates an initial step
of the history I have just sketched out. Even if this history cannot be
treated within a single paper, I consider particularly important the fact that
it suggests a more reﬁned picture concerning the shaping of occasionalism
in the seventeenth century. I would not deny Malebranche’s role in advan-
cing and spreading occasionalism; however, I would contest the idea that
there was actually one occasionalism. More precisely, it seems feasible
that multiple authors developed different argumentative strategies. I
suggest that their distinct strategies modiﬁed the kind of occasionalism
developed by each author. A more precise appreciation of La Forge’s use
of NT is a ﬁrst important step to explore these alternative paths.
Second, by focusing on La Forge’s commitment to NT, my treatment of La
Forge will differ from the standard way to discuss his position. For instance,
I will not deal, unless incidentally, with La Forge’s possible inﬂuence on
Malebranche. Rather, I will focus mainly on La Forge’s account of body–
body causation. Moreover, even if the argument concerning continuous cre-
ation is usually considered as the most important proposed by him, I will
argue that La Forge’s appeal to continuous creation is rather a consequence
of his general strategy grounded in NT.
Daniel Garber was among the ﬁrst to stress the importance of La Forge’s
use of continuous creation, although he discussed La Forge’s argument
without mentioning any possible connection to NT (see Garber, ‘How
5Before Le Grand, Pierre-Sylvain Régis, another author of Cartesian textbooks, also invoked
this argument in a similar way in his Cours entier de philosophie, ou Systeme general selon les
principes de M. Descartes. See Régis, Cours entier de philosophie, ou Systeme general selon
les principes de M. Descartes, book 1, Physique, II, ii, ch. 4, 303–6.
6Malebranche used it only incidentally in his Entretiens (1688), probably to counter Fonte-






























God Causes Motion’ and Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics,
297–301).7 Following Garber’s suggestion, several other scholars con-
sidered La Forge’s formulation of continuous creation as his main – and
arguably only – argument for occasionalism (cf. Bardout, ‘Occasionalism’,
145; Nadler, Occasionalism, 127–30; Eaton and Higgerson, ‘Causation
and the Cartesian Reduction of Motion’). On the contrary, I will argue
that such a reading unduly isolates La Forge’s use of continuous creation
from its context. Indeed, I will show that La Forge does not use continuous
creation as an independent argument, but rather to support his main discus-
sion grounded in NT. Moreover, I will contend that a better understanding of
the connection between NT and continuous creation can provide a more con-
sistent reading of La Forge’s own position concerning mind–body
interactionism.
Indeed, Steven Nadler has claimed that La Forge, prima facie, embraced
occasionalism only concerning body–body interactions, while proposing
an interactionist account for mind–body union. According to Nadler, in La
Forge’s view minds remain truly active and endowed with a real power to
operate through their will. In this sense, La Forge’s occasionalism would
be only partial.8 However, Nadler also stresses that the argument La Forge
used to undermine body–body interactions, i.e. continuous creation, is
doomed to push La Forge towards full-blown occasionalism because it is dif-
ﬁcult to conceive of why this argument should not apply to minds as well.9
7This reading seems strongly inﬂuenced by the fact that Malebranche repeats in his Entretiens
(VII, §6) an argument actually very close to that of La Forge except for the fact that Male-
branche mentions just continuous creation and eliminates any reference to NT. Pessin,
‘Does Continuous Creation Entail Occasionalism? Malebranche (and Descartes)’ already
argued, concerning Malebranche, that continuous creation does not entail occasionalism
and that, to establish it, further arguments are needed (no-necessary-connection argument,
for instance, which is not present in La Forge). I will prove that this conclusion can be held
also concerning La Forge’s use of continuous creation.
8The distinction between partial and full occasionalism has already been drawn by Radner,
‘Occasionalism’, Garber ‘How God Causes Motion’, Clarke, ‘Causal Powers and Occasion-
alism from Descartes to Malebranche’, Bardout, ‘Occasionalism’, Kolesnik-Antoine, ‘Les
occasionalismes en France à l’âge classique. Le « cas » arnaldien’. However, ‘partial’ occa-
sionalism is often considered instable (e.g. by Clarke, ‘Causal Powers and Occasionalism
from Descartes to Malebranche’, or Bardout, ‘Occasionalism’) if not inconsistent (Nadler,
Occasionalism, 141).
9Historically, Jacob Gousset was the ﬁrst who argued that La Forge should defend a full-
blown occasionalism. Gousset considered La Forge as the main source for Malebranche
and even for Régis. However, Gousset contrasted a supposed colloquium he asserted to
have had with La Forge in 1658 and the published Treatise. In this colloquium, Gousset
reported that La Forge’s argument was intended to show that God directly produces every
change in the created world, even and more importantly within the mind (Gousset, Causarum
Primae et Secundarum realis operatio rationibus conﬁrmatur, et ab abjectionibus defenditur,
§7, 6–7). Accordingly, the mind could not produce any idea without God’s support. However,
Gousset recognized that in the published Treatise La Forge never envisaged such an argument
but, on the contrary, he appeared to support an interactionistic account of mind-body union (cf.
Gousset, Causarum Primae et Secundarum realis operatio rationibus conﬁrmatur, et ab





























According to Nadler, thus, La Forge’s partial occasionalism turns out to be
inconsistent. On the contrary, I will suggest that this inconsistency vanishes
if we reconstruct La Forge’s view by considering NT (rather than continuous
creation) as his main argument against body–body interaction. Before dis-
cussing this issue (§4), I will present in turn how NT emerges in Descartes
(§2) and how La Forge recast it (§3).
MOTION AS A MODIFICATION OF BODIES
Great efforts have been made to determine whether Descartes himself was
the ﬁrst early modern occasionalist,10 but I am not interested here in
dealing with this thorny problem. Rather, it seems much more interesting
to stress the ambiguities of Descartes’ own position. This is not, of course,
to demonstrate how useless and uncertain Descartes’ philosophy was – as
Pascal claimed – but to evaluate how the different elements embedded in
Descartes’ texts may be reconciled or erased by different interpretations of
his thought.11 Occasionalism was one of those interpretations. Even if it
appeared – or rather was proclaimed to be – the reading closest to Descartes’
own position, it might be fruitful to understand the hermeneutic choices
occasionalists had to make.
In dealing with Descartes’ alleged occasionalism, scholars have focused
on articles 36–37 of the second part of the Principles, in which God is intro-
duced as the ﬁrst cause of movement. Concerning the communication of
movement, however, the most relevant text appears a few articles later as
a commentary on the third law of nature. Particularly, according to the
second part of this law, when a moving body collides with another body,
abjectionibus defenditur, §20, 31). Then, Gousset accused La Forge of masking his real views
just to avoid scandals. According to Gousset, La Forge’s account of mind-body union allows
only a union per accidens, and La Forge could not avoid considering God as the only true
cause of anything (Gousset, Causarum Primae et Secundarum realis operatio rationibus con-
ﬁrmatur, et ab abjectionibus defenditur, §§21–28, 32–43). Rather paradoxically, Malebranche
would have exploited the principle that Gousset attributed to La Forge in their private collo-
quium (Gousset, Causarum Primae et Secundarum realis operatio rationibus conﬁrmatur, et
ab abjectionibus defenditur, §36, 50: ‘nec sola illa quae in Libro Forgius repetierat, sed et id
quod mihi in Colloquio dixerat, docet Malebranchius, nempe mentem non habere potentiam
novae cogitationis in se formandae’). Despite Gousset’s critique, Ruardus Andala (Cartesius
versus spinozismi eversor, Franequerae, 1719, 133) plainly recognized La Forge as a true
mind–body interactionist (see, on this point, Scribano, Da Descartes a Spinoza, 72).
10Generally, I subscribe to the view according to which Descartes was not an Occasionalist.
On such a position see, for instance, Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation, Kolesnik-Antoine,
L’homme certésien, Machamer and McGuire, Descartes’s Changing Mind. Platt, ‘Divine
Activity and Motive Power in Descartes’s Physics’, has nicely outlined the status quaestionis
of the current debate, further supporting the non-occasionalistic reading of Descartes.
11I follow here the line of research developed by Bardout, ‘Occasionalism’, Schamltz, ‘Occa-
sionalism and Mechanism’, Nadler, Occasionalism and Kolesnik-Antoine, ‘Les voies du






























if the force of the ﬁrst body to continue is greater than the resistance of the
second, the ﬁrst one carries the other along with it, and loses as much motion
as it gives to the second body. To prove this claim, Descartes argues:
from the fact that all places are full of bodies and that, nevertheless, the move-
ment of each of these bodies tends in a straight line; it is obvious that when
God ﬁrst created the world, He not only moved its parts in various ways,
but also simultaneously caused some of the parts to push others and to trans-
fer their motion to these others. So in now maintaining the world by the same
action and with the same laws with which He created it, He conserves motion;
not always contained in the same parts of matter, but transferred from some
parts to others depending on the ways in which they come in contact.
(PP2, 42; AT VIII, 66; transl. in Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, 62,
emphasis added)
For present purposes, what is noteworthy is Descartes’ plain admission of
a true transfer of motion between colliding bodies. Picot’s 1647 French
translation even reinforces this impression by glossing the passage
‘motum, non iisdem materiae partibus semper inﬁxum, sed ex unis in alias
prout sibi mutuo occurrunt transeuntem, conservet’ with the corresponding
il conserve maintenant en elles toutes le mouvement qu’il y a mis dès lors avec
la propriété qu’il a donné à ce mouvement, de ne demeurer pas toujours
attaché aux mêmes parties de la matière, et de passer des unes aux autres,
selon leurs diverses rencontres.
(AT IX-2, 88, emphasis added)
Here, the simple fact that the movement can be transferred from one body
to another becomes a property of movement itself, which is continuously (re)
created by God, together with its quantity.
Descartes states expressly in PP2, 25 that motion is just a modiﬁcation of a
body. Indeed, after having presented his deﬁnition of movement in terms of a
translation from contiguous bodies to other contiguous bodies, he explains:
I also say that it is a transference, not the force or action which transfers, in
order to show that this motion is always in the moving body and not in the
thing which moves it (because it is not usual to distinguish between these
two with sufﬁcient care); and in order to show that it is only a mode [of the
moving body], and not a substance, just as shape is a mode of the thing
shaped, and rest, of the thing which is at rest.
(PP2, 25; AT VIII, 54; transl. in Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, 51)
Descartes’ careful use of language seems to suggest that he has reasons
for making clear that motion in bodies should be viewed as a modiﬁcation
of them. The most evident reason is probably Descartes’ need to consider
motion as something quantiﬁable. However, provided that ‘there is no real





























difference between quantity and the extended substance’ (PP2, 8; AT VIII,
44, transl. in Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, 42), in order to make
movement quantiﬁable it should be granted that movement participates in
extension. The simplest way to grant this point would be to acknowledge
that extension implies movement. Nevertheless, this is exactly what Des-
cartes ought to avoid, to prevent the well-known materialistic and atheistic
conclusions that such a claim would imply. On the contrary, granting that
movement is just a modiﬁcation of an extended thing, Descartes can hold
both that extension does not imply movement – because a body without
movement is still a body – and that movement participates in quantity,
and is therefore quantiﬁable. Because it is quantiﬁable, Descartes can
treat movement as something that can be divided or redistributed
between different bodies according to the third law of nature and the
rules of impact.
So far so good. But what does it mean exactly that a modiﬁcation can be
transferred from one body to the other? Henry More posed this question to
Descartes in a letter dated the 23 July 1649 (AT V, 382). Descartes’ reply
– dated August 1649 – was the following:
you observe correctly that ‘motion, being a mode of body, cannot pass from
one body to another’. But that is not what I wrote; indeed I think that motion,
considered as such a mode, continually changes. For there is one mode in the
ﬁrst point of a body A in that it is separated from the ﬁrst point of a body B;
and another mode in that it is separated from the second point; and another
mode in that it is separated from the third point; and so on. But when I said
that the same amount of motion always remains in matter, I meant this
about the force which impels its parts, which is applied at different times to
different parts of matter in accordance with the laws set out in articles 45
and following of Part Two.
(AT V, 404–5, transl. in Descartes, The Philosophical Writings, 382)
This answer is puzzling. We have just read, in PP2, 42, that ‘motum, [… ]
ex unis in alias prout sibi mutuo occurrunt transeuntem’. Therefore, if we
decide to take seriously Descartes’ answer to More, we have to interpret
PP2, 42 and related passages by taking the ‘transfer’ of motion as a reconﬁ-
guration of the force of movement without real transfer. We will see that, fol-
lowing this suggestion, La Forge attempts to provide a coherent interpretation
of Descartes’ physics which actually gives up any communication of move-
ment between bodies. This is, indeed, the occasionalistic reading.
FROM NT TO CONTINUOUS CREATION
NT appears as the positive statement of what More asked Descartes in the
summer of 1649. In Chapter 16 of his Traité de l’esprit de l’Homme, La






























occasionalism. In this section, I will focus on La Forge’s treatment of NT,
and I will address how this discussion supports mind–body interactionism
in the next section.
In Chapter 16, La Forge presents two main arguments. The ﬁrst expressly
uses NT to show that the force of movement cannot be inherent to bodies.
The second focuses on the fact that only God can produce the force of move-
ment. I will discuss them in turn.
Concerning the ﬁrst argument, La Forge begins by invoking the Cartesian
distinction between movement and force of movement.12 The core of his
demonstration consists in showing why force of movement cannot be some-
thing corporeal. The proof runs as follows:
motion is only a mode which is not distinct from the body to which it belongs
and which can no more pass from one subject to another than the other modes
of matter, nor can it belong to a spiritual substance. But the motive force, i.e.
the force which transports a body from one vicinity to another and which
applies it successively to different parts of the bodies which is leaves behind
[… ], is not only distinct from this application but also from the body which
it applies and moves [… ]. Now if the force which moves is distinct from the
thing which is moved and if bodies alone can be moved, it follows clearly
that no body can have the power of self-movement in itself. For if that were
the case this force would not be distinct from the body, because no attribute
or property is distinct from the thing to which it belongs. If a body cannot
move itself, it is obvious in my opinion that it cannot move another body.
Therefore every body which is motion must be pushed by something which
is not itself a body and which is completely distinct from it.
(La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, 145, emphasis added)
Because movement is only modally distinguished from the body, it cannot
be separated from the moved body and it cannot be transferred from one
body to another. However, because the force of movement can be separated
from a body, it should be really distinguished from the body. Now, because
the force of movement is really distinguished from the moved body, this
force is not corporeal and does not pertain to such a body. Therefore, a
body cannot have the force to move itself and, thus, it cannot have the
force to move another body.
The reason to distinguish between movement and force of movement lies
in the fact that movement is just a modiﬁcation of the body and no modiﬁ-
cation can be transferred from a subject to another (NT). On the contrary, it is
necessary to think that the same force of movement, which causes the motion
12However, it should be remembered that in PP2, 43, Descartes does not draw any sharp dis-
tinction between force and movement. There he describes the force of movement in terms of
the force to persevere in its own state, which seems something very close to the quantity of
movement.





























of a body, applies differently to different bodies, and thus it must be really
distinguished from them.
The fact that the force of movement can be applied to different bodies
appears as the crucial point in La Forge’s argument. However, it might be
asked why we should grant that the force is separable from the body and
can be transferred. In the end, what prevents us from claiming that even
the force is a modiﬁcation of the body and thus cannot be separated from
it? La Forge seems well aware of this problem and proposes a reductio ad
absurdum to support this point:
I may be told that I assume without argument that the force which moves must
be distinct from the thing which is moved. [… ] But let us assume, if you
wish, that this force is a mode of a body; it could not then be distinguished
from it and consequently it could not pass from one body to another. If you
conceive it in the same way as real qualities are conceived in the Schools
and if you think it is deﬁnitely an accident of a body, even if it is distinct
from it, then you would have to conceive that it subdivides itself when one
body moves another and that it gives part of its movement to the other
body and is therefore itself a body, at the same time as you assume that it is
distinct from corporeal nature; for anything which is divisible and which
has parts which can exist independently is a body; or you would have to
say that it does not subdivide but that the body in which it is present produces
a similar property in the body it touches when it pushes it. You thereby give to
bodies the power of creation.
(La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, 145–6 emphasis added)
Under the hypothesis that the force of movement is a modiﬁcation of the
body, NT prevents any transfer of such a force from one body to another.
However, La Forge assumes as factual that impact implies a redistribution
of quantity of motion. Provided that the total amount of motion is conserved,
this redistribution can be explained by redistribution either of the movement
itself or of the force of movement. But if movement is a modiﬁcation of the
bodies, NT prevents its transfer. Thus, it must be the force of movement that
is redistributed among the colliding bodies. This implies that the force of
movement would be simultaneously non-distinguished from bodies (which
was the hypothesis) and actually distinguished from them (because of the
fact that it is redistributed). Unfortunately, this conclusion leads to absurd-
ities. Indeed, either the force of movement is something like a real quality,
which La Forge considers a contradictory entity, or we should accept that
bodies have the power to create accidents in other bodies, which is taken
as another absurdity.13 Thus, the force of movement cannot be a modiﬁ-
cation of a body, and the hypothesis must be rejected.
13Here, La Forge is arguably rejecting Hobbes’s account, according to which bodies actually






























La Forge presents his use of NT as nothing but a faithful reading of Des-
cartes. Not surprisingly, he quotes at length Descartes’ answer to More,
suggesting it as the true interpretation of Descartes’ physics.14 Nevertheless,
up to this point, La Forge has only proved that force of movement is not
something corporeal. This implies that all physical movements are always
brought about by immaterial causes, which allows (as we will see in §4)
that in some cases, immaterial substances like human minds can cause
some physical movements, i.e. voluntary motions, through the laws of
their union with the body. However, La Forge clearly would not assert
that ﬁnite immaterial substances, such as angels or intermediate kinds of
beings, produce every physical movement.15 Therefore, La Forge still
needs a further argument to refute this kind of inference and show that, gen-
erally speaking, God himself directly moves physical bodies. This is the
reason why continuous creation enters into La Forge’s argument.
Indeed, just after the previous quote, La Forge introduces a further part of
his discussion, which clariﬁes his point. La Forge reminds us that movement
produces every difference we observe in the physical world. Thus, if God
would eliminate movement, the world would remain an inert mass of
matter whose parts would be indistinguishable. Accordingly, La Forge
focuses on the conditions in which God must introduce movement in such
a mass to make a single body move.
[1] I also claim that there is no creature, spiritual or corporeal, which can cause
change in [matter] or in any of its parts, in the second moment of their cre-
ation, if the Creator does not do so himself. Since it was He who produced
this part of matter in place A, for example, not only must he continue to
produce it if he wishes it to continue to exist but also, since he cannot
create it everywhere or nowhere, he must put it in place B himself if he
wishes it to be there. For if he put it anywhere else there is no force
capable of removing it from that location.
[2] Let us even consider that if God gave this particular body A all the motive
force which he uses at present to move the whole of nature, it would not be
enough even with all that to change its location, both because it would not
be able to overcome the resistance of the rest of matter which we assume is
at rest, and because in order to make body A capable of leaving its place to
enter that of another body, the other body which it replaces would also
have to move at the same moment that body A begins to move, since it is
impossible for the ﬁrst body to take the place of the second unless, at the
same time as it tries to do so, the second body leaves that place and enters
that of a third body and the third enters that of a fourth, and so on. That is
14This strategy has a clear polemical target, namely, Regius and his doctrine of the impetus,
conceived of as an impressed quality, which passes from one body to the other (see La
Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, 148; cf. Regius, Philosophia Naturalis, 11–12).
15On the contrary, La Forge criticized Campanella for having supported a similar view: see La
Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, ch. 5, 51.





























how it could happen when everything is at rest. Therefore no matter what
force God gives to body A to move itself, it would be ineffective. That is
why when God decided to move matter in various ways he had to apply the
force that he chose to put into matter to many of its parts at the same time,
so that they could give up their places to each other at the same instant
without which no motion could have been produced.
(La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, 147, emphasis added. Numbers in
brackets added to help discussion)
Scholars used to consider the appeal to continuous creation (point 1) as an
independent argument. However, contrary to this established view, I suggest
that this reading cannot work. Indeed, without the further development pro-
vided by the discussion at point 2, what is stated at point 1 remains unproved.
Why should it be God himself that has to recreate a moving body in a certain
place? Why is there no creature, spiritual or corporeal, which can cause
change in the position of a body? As La Forge says, ‘for if he put it anywhere
else there is no force capable of removing it from that location’. But this is a
mere assertion, which is proved only at point 2. Evidently, if God has to
recreate a body in each of its positions, then nothing can work against
God’s force.16 However, without establishing why God has to do so, the
mere appeal to his continuous creation begs the question.
Rather, La Forge’s argument suggests that he aims at proving why the
nature of force is such that God has not only to continuously recreate a
moving body, but also must place that body in each of the different positions
that the body undergoes throughout its movement. The reason for this
16Perhaps it might be supposed that La Forge here is equating God’s force with God’s will, and
this is the reason why nothing can resist God’s act of placing a body in a certain position. But
this supposition has no textual support, because La Forge never proposes such an equation,
which was extensively used by Malebranche. Before Malebranche, Clerselier seems the
ﬁrst to have objected such a claim to La Forge. In the third volume of Descartes’ correspon-
dence, published in 1667, Clerselier included a letter of his own to La Forge (dated on 4
December 1660), in which he complains ‘ie voy fort peu de difference entre ce que vous
pensez de la façon dont l’Ame et le corps agissent l’un sur l’autre, et ce que ie vous ay fait
voir que ie pensois là dessus’ (Descartes, Lettres de M. Descartes, où sont traitées les plus
belles questions de la morale, de la physique, de la médecine et des mathématiques, 641).
Indeed, Clerselier presents an argument to prove that force of movement should be incorporeal
and that the mind has a real power to move the body. However, he never mentions NT and he
demonstrates that God is the true origin of motion because an inﬁnite power is needed to create
movement ex nihilo into matter (see Descartes, Lettres de M. Descartes, où sont traitées les
plus belles questions de la morale, de la physique, de la médecine et des mathématiques,
642). It should be remarked that this argument is actually different from that presented by
La Forge, who does not equate God’s force and God’s will and does not invoke metaphysical
considerations concerning the power to bring about things or modes from nothing. This
implies that, even in the case that Clerselier actually wrote this letter to La Forge in 1660,
La Forge does not endorse the same argument of Clerselier. This means that La Forge was
aware of the possibility to use this argument, but he evidently did not embrace it. Therefore,
it follows a fortiori that we have not to project Clerselier’s argument (which we suppose La






























derives from the conditions of motion in a plenum. La Forge’s argument has
two premises. First, the force of rest of an indeﬁnite mass of bodies at rest is
even greater than the inﬁnite force of movement of just one single body.17
Second, to allow just one single body to move, it is necessary that all other
bodies move too. It follows that, in such a condition, even if a single body
had an inﬁnite force of movement, it would not move unless other bodies
also moved. Hence, because in order to move a body from one place to
another, it is necessary that all other bodies move, it follows that the force
that moves the body is the same that moves all the other bodies, namely, the
same force that introduces motion in matter, i.e. God’s force. Accordingly,
the only force able to move a body away from a certain position is the same
force that simultaneously moves all the other bodies, i.e. God’s force.
Because motion is nothing but the passage from one position to another,
God himself not only recreates the moving body but recreates it in each of
its positions.
What follows is the remarkable conclusion that God’s continuous creation
as such does not entail occasionalism. Rather, only insofar as we acknowl-
edge the difﬁculties raised by speciﬁc physical concepts, such as the
nature of force and bodies, an occasionalistic reading of God’s continuous
creation appears the best solution to face those problems.
If we realize that La Forge introduces his reinterpretation of continuous
creation only to complement NT, we can also stress that La Forge’s treatment
of this argument does not suggest any kind of generalization concerning the
way in which God’s continuous creation should be conceived concerning
thinking substances. The reason why God has to recreate not only bodies,
but also bodies in speciﬁc places, that is, bodies and their modiﬁcations, is
grounded in the nature of bodies and in the conditions for a movement in
a plenum. But a thinking substance neither moves nor exists in a plenum.
Therefore, God’s modus operandi cannot be the same.18 This is the reason
why La Forge presents these arguments exposed in Chapter 16 of his
Traité as strong support for his interactionist account of mind–body union.
17Concerning this point, Arnold Geulincx proposed an argument close to La Forge’s in his
Physical Disputations (1663): see Disputationes Physicae, III, §§6–7 in Land2, 502. The
same argument is reproduced, with some changes, in Geulincx’s Metaphysica vera, III, 5
(Land2, 191). However, Geulincx’s Metaphysics will be published posthumously only in
1691. For the present discussion, it is noteworthy that this kind of argument is used exactly
to support God’s direct intervention starting from physics.
18This remark does not imply that God’s continuous creation does not apply to minds. La
Forge states clearly in chapter 12 (La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, 113) that the dur-
ation of a mind depends on God’s continuous creation. But he infers this conclusion from the
Cartesian assumption that ﬁnite substance cannot have duration without being conserved by
God, and he does not suggest in any way that God’s support exceeds the mere maintenance
of the actual existence of the mind.





























LA FORGE’S PARTIAL OCCASIONALISM
The main task of La Forge’s Traité de l’esprit de l’Homme consists in pro-
viding an account of human mind and mind–body union following the prin-
ciples of Descartes. Despite appearances, La Forge’s position on this topic is
not a kind of occasionalism:
we should say likewise that a body and mind are united when some move-
ments of the ﬁrst depend on thoughts of the second and, reciprocally, some
thoughts of the second depend on movements of the ﬁrst, whether the cause
of this dependence comes from the will of the mind which is united or
derives from another will which is superior to its own.
(La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, ch. 13, 121)
La Forge makes clear that this mutual dependence of mind and body
needs to be conceived of in terms of causation, even if it is a kind of equiv-
ocal causation (cf. La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, ch. 13, 124).19
Chapter 15 explicitly states that God’s involvement in mind–body causa-
tion consists only in establishing the general laws under which these two
substances can operate upon each other (La Forge, Treatise on the
Human Mind, ch. 15, 134). La Forge, therefore, claims that God’s will is
only the general cause of the mind–body union while corporeal disposi-
tions and will are the two speciﬁc causes of all that happens in the
mind–body compound (La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, ch. 15,
135–6). Moreover, he often repeats that the mind is an active substance,
endowed with true causal power to produce effects, mainly through its
will.20
For instance, according to La Forge, even in the case of non-voluntary
ideas, such as sensory ideas, the mind remains active although external
objects, through the union, oblige the power of thinking to produce ideas
corresponding to corporeal species impressed upon the pineal gland.
19Cf. also Nadler, Occasionalism, 109. Nadler, Occasionalism, 114 also stressed that La
Forge’s account of mind–body interaction is not actually different from that pointed out by
Descartes himself against Regius.
20La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, ch. 11, 97–8:
the essence of this faculty [i.e. the will] consists ﬁrstly in the fact that it is the active
principle of all the mind’s actions which chooses from itself and by itself and deter-
mines itself to accept or reject what the understanding perceives or remain sus-
pended when something is not yet perceived clearly enough. [… ] It is so free
that it would involve a contradiction to say that any external agent could so
violate its freedom as to make it will something despite itself. The source of this































Indeed, while the corporeal species remain only the remote cause, the mind–
body union is still the principal cause of those ideas, which are produced by
the power of thinking of the mind itself (proximate cause) (see La Forge,
Treatise on the Human Mind, ch. 10, 93–4). Moreover, La Forge seems to
conﬂate the power of thinking with will, suggesting that every idea is actu-
ally a voluntary idea, at least qua idea.21
However, La Forge plainly acknowledges that this account may appear
unintelligible because it allows causal interactions between something cor-
poreal and something non-corporeal. This brings us back to Chapter 16,
which contains La Forge’s arguments for occasionalism. The way in
which we ought to interpret these arguments is stated at the very beginning
of the chapter:
I think most people would not believe me if I said that it is no more difﬁcult to
conceive how the human mind, without being extended, can move the body
and how the body without being a spiritual thing can act on the mind, than
to conceive how a body has the power to move itself and to communicate
its motion to another body. Yet there is nothing more true.22
(La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, ch. 16, 143)
21Cf. La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, ch. 10, 94:
although our thoughts follow one another and although it is the external objects or the
ﬁrst thoughts which provide an occasion for the will to determine itself and form the idea
of subsequent thoughts, that does not imply that one should not say that it is the will
which is the principal and proximate cause of the idea. Otherwise one would have to
say that it is the external objects which produce the ideas that we have of them and
not the mind, since it is their presence which provides an occasion for the mind to
think about them.
Note that the impossibility for external objects to produce ideas clearly does not refer to
the fact that external objects offer the content of ideas, but to the possibility that they
directly produce the ideas qua ideas, that is as a modiﬁcation of a thinking substance.
According to La Forge, external objects are not the proximate but the remote cause of
our ideas of them. In so doing, La Forge once again follows closely Descartes’ strategy
against Regius, as it results from the Notae in programma quoddam (AT VIII-2, 359). It
might be noted that this claim is very close also to that used by Marin Cureau de La
Chambre in his Quelle est la connoissances des bêtes et jusques où elle peut aller
(appendix of Les charactères des passions, vol. 2, Paris, 1645) against Pierre Chanet.
On the importance of that episode for the history of occasionalism, see Scribano,
‘Introduzione’.
22Cf. also a few lines below, where La Forge says
it is necessary [… ] to remove from many people’s minds the unfortunate tendency to
believe that unless their soul were corporeal, it would not have the power to move the
body because, they say, it could not do so without touching it.
Evidently, thus, La Forge aims at ruling out body–body causation to ground mind–body
interactions, that is, to allow interaction between immaterial minds and bodies.





























Evidently, Chapter 16 serves two functions in La Forge’s Treatise. First, it
is intended to show that body–body causation is no easier to conceive than
mind–body causation. Second, because only a non-corporeal force can move
a body, there is no reason to rule out mind–body interactions. In that view,
La Forge exploits an occasionalistic position concerning body–body causa-
tion to ground mind–body interactionism.23
Steven Nadler rejects this solution, claiming that God’s continuous cre-
ation should apply also to minds, and thus La Forge’s claim concerning
the mind’s activity would be inconsistent:
La Forge could hold that while, with respect to bodies, God’s conserving
causal activity is identical with God’s modal causal activity, in the case of
minds it is not. [… ] This suggestion, while it would rescue La Forge’s
account from the problem I discuss, seems very strange. It is awkward, to
say the least, to claim that God’s sustaining activity differs in character
depending on the kind of substance – mind or body – that he is sustaining.
This would be, in effect, to claim that there are two kinds of divine conserva-
tion: one for material beings (which, at the same time and by the same action,
gives them their modiﬁcations) and another for spiritual beings (which leaves
them able to cause their own properties).
(Nadler, Occasionalism, 140)
I do not see why La Forge should consider this position unacceptable, par-
ticularly if this allows him to secure his account concerning themind’s activity
and it is not intrinsically inconsistent. But to accept two kinds of God’s invol-
vement with ﬁnite things seems coherent with the general Cartesian claim that
there are two kinds of substances, and these are completely different in nature
from (?) one another. La Forge’s reinterpretation ofGod’s continuous creation
expressly aims to ﬁll a gap in the kind of causation present in the material
world, according to which bodies alone would be insufﬁcient to explain
motion and thus physical phenomena. Because this problem does not arise
with minds, which are completely different kinds of substances, there is no
need to invoke God’s action in the same way concerning minds.
As La Forge himself expressly points out:
I would add to Mr. Descartes that although all things depend on God, as he
says, they do so in different ways. For in the production of effects to which
neither our own will nor that of any other free agent contributes, one could
say that God consulted his own will alone, by which he unconditionally deter-
mined to produce them in a certain way and at a certain time; but in the case of
effects to which our will contributes, God did not consider his own will alone
but he also included the consent of our will in his decree, and it was only after
having foreseen how our will would determine itself in such and such
23On mind–body interactionism, Bardout, ‘Occasionalism’, 141–2, stresses the afﬁnity






























circumstances that he consequently willed absolutely that such effects would
result.
(La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, ch. 11, 106–7, emphasis added)
Here, La Forge clearly aims at clarifying Descartes’ account of will rather
than at contradicting it. Thus, he plainly acknowledges a difference in God’s
modus operandi, due to the difference between extended (inert) substances
and spiritual (active) substances. The arguments developed in Chapter 16
explain in detail the grounds of such difference rather than undermining it.
Indeed, the main difﬁculty envisaged by Nadler seems to be the apparent
conﬂict between the general claim, according to which God moves all
bodies, and the more restricted claim, according to which the human mind
moves its body in certain circumstances, i.e. concerning voluntary
motions. Consequently, it might be objected that the ‘power’ or ‘force’ of
the mind to move the body is nothing but the fact that God moves the
body, through the pineal gland, when the appropriate volition takes place
in the mind. In that case, it would follow that it is not actually the mind
that produces voluntary motions. Accordingly, continuous creation would
lead La Forge to embrace full occasionalism. However, if we look at the
way in which La Forge has supported his whole argument, a feasible
answer exists that avoids such a conclusion.
Consider body–body causation. NT shows that a body is insufﬁcient to
bring about effects upon other bodies insofar as it cannot transfer its move-
ment. This is the reason why God has to provide his support to physical inter-
actions. The output of these interactions is deducible from the physical
features of bodies, through the laws of nature and the rules of impact, for
instance. However, to produce these results, bodies need God to add his
force to them because this force cannot be a modiﬁcation of bodies for NT.
Consider now mind–body causation. In this case, the mind clearly does
not create new movement, which would be contrary to God’s conservation
of the total amount of movement in the world. However, to produce physical
effects, it is sufﬁcient that the mind changes the determination of animal
spirits through the pineal gland (see La Forge, Treatise on the Human
Mind, ch. 15, 139–42). In laymen’s terms, the pineal gland is like a joystick,
by acting upon which the whole bodily machine moves in this or that way.
Evidently, this can happen only because certain animal spirits ﬂow in certain
nerves, which produce certain reactions in muscles and so on. In all these
further stages, God supports the physical action by providing his force of
movement. Nonetheless, to allow mind–body interaction, God has only
had to establish since eternity that the mind has the power to directly
modify the determination of animal spirits through the pineal gland in agree-
ment with the content of its will. Indeed, NT granted that non-corporeal enti-
ties usually act upon physical entities, and no transfer of motion is needed to
change the determination of a moving body. In the case of mind–body union,
thus, God needs to establish just the general laws under which such kind of





























interaction has to take place. Once these laws are provided, God’s direct
intervention no longer seems necessary.
This conclusion is supported by a further difference between the actions of
a mere body and that of a body united with a mind. In the ﬁrst case, the body
undergoes nothing but what is implied in its bodily nature. In the second
case, it happens that the body is also used to produce actions that depend
on the (free) volitions of its mind. Accordingly, when a stone turns in a
sling, there is just one effect that it can produce according to the laws of
motion, namely, it tends to proceed along the tangent. However, when I
move my arm to the left because I want to, there are no physical reasons
why God should move my body in such a way. Indeed, my arm could
move equally well to the right. This is to say that, in case of voluntary
motions, the law of the physical world is not sufﬁcient to establish the com-
plete cause of such kind of effect. Insofar as we accept the existence of
voluntary motions, we have to accept that even God, to produce such a
movement in my arm, needs to look at the content of my will to produce
that effect.24
Therefore, even if God moves generally all bodies, in case of a body united
with a mind, this body produces voluntary motions that cannot be produced
only by God, whose force is necessary but not sufﬁcient to bring about these
kinds of effects.25 In other words, in the case of voluntary motions, God
established to produce nothing but the movements that follow from the deter-
mination that the mind impresses upon animal spirits through the pineal
gland, according to the content of its (free) volitions. NT, as such,
grounds the fact that an immaterial agent like a mind causes effects on phys-
ical bodies. Moreover, the mind causes such effects without the need to
transfer any motion to the human body, and thus, again, NT cannot be
invoked against such a kind of interaction. Therefore, it might be said
that, in such cases, the will really uses God’s force to produce what it
wants.26 Hence, La Forge’s reinterpretation of God’s continuous creation
24As La Forge clearly states (Treatise on the Human Mind, ch. 16, 150):
you should not say that is God who does everything and that the body and mind do not
really act on each other. For if the body had not had such a movement, the mind would
never have had such a thought, and if the mind had not had such a thought, the body
might also never have had such a movement.
25According to Clatterbaugh, ‘Cartesian Causality’, because Descartes assumes that God is the
total and efﬁcient cause of all things, he should be committed to (full-blown) occasionalism. I
suggest that, even if (from the point of view of God’s potentia absoluta) nothing can happen
without God’s will, in some cases (from the point of view of God’s potentia ordinata) God
does not need to act directly to bring about certain effects. Because we assume that occasion-
alism implies a direct intervention by God, we can thus conclude that a general assertion of
God’s absolute power does not entail any commitment to a (full-blown) occasionalism.
26See La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, ch. 16, 151: ‘there are certain bodily movements






























does not prevent the mind from having real causal power to act upon the
body even if this causal power is conditioned, that is, should be brought
about following the general laws that God established concerning motion
and mind–body union. Nonetheless, having a conditioned causal power
does not mean that the mind has no causal power at all. Indeed, as La
Forge said, echoing a letter Descartes wrote to Elisabeth,27 ‘the force
which the mind has to move the body, and that which the body has to stimu-
late various thoughts in the mind are necessary consequences of this union’
(La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, ch. 16, 150, emphasis added).
NT established that God has to intervene in physical relationships only to
bring about those effects that bodies have no means to produce. Even if it
might sound paradoxical, God’s intervention remains instrumental, that is,
it concerns how to bring about a certain effect, rather than the effect itself.
Concerning body–body interactions, God has to constantly and directly
intervene to redistribute force of movement because NT forbids the direct
transfer of motion and because the great majority of physical effects are pro-
duced in that way. In mind–body interactions, however, God established
since eternity the rules of the union, and he no longer needs to intervene
in such kinds of effects.
This is exactly what La Forge himself stresses:
although God is thus the universal cause of all the motions which occur in the
world, I also recognize bodies and minds as the particular causes of these same
motions, not really in producing any ‘impressed’ quality in the way the
Schools explain it, but in determining and forcing [en déterminant et obli-
geant] the ﬁrst cause to apply his force and motive power to the bodies to
which he would not otherwise have applied it, according to the way He
decided to govern himself in relation to bodies and minds; that is, for
bodies, according to the laws of motion which are so well explained in
Book Two of Mr Descartes’s Principles; and for minds, according to the
scope of the power which He chose to give to their wills. The power of
bodies and minds to move consists in that alone. Therefore it is no more dif-
ﬁcult to understand how a mind can act on a body and move it, than to con-
ceive how one body pushes another.
(La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind, ch. 16, 148, emphasis added)
well disposed, such as those movements which are called voluntary.’ Historically, Johannes
Schotanus (Questiones metaphysicae, Franequerae, 1687, 320) expressly criticized La
Forge for having subordinated God’s decrees to that of ﬁnite creatures by accusing him of
molinism. On Schotanus’s dealing with La Forge, see Scribano, Da Descartes a Spinoza,
23–52 and 63–6.
27Descartes to Elisabeth, 21 May 1643 (AT3: 665), in Shapiro, Correspondence Between
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes, 65:
for the soul and the body together, we have only that of their union, on which depends
that of the power [la force] the soul has to move the body and the body to act on the
soul, in causing its sensations and passions.





























In body–body causation, bodies are still the explanatory causes of
motions. Indeed, NT does not deny that the results of impacts follow from
the physical parameters of the colliding bodies according to the laws of
nature, but only that such bodies can bring about those effects on their
own. Concerning mind–body causation, minds are also direct causes of
voluntary motions because ‘the power which [God] chose to give to their
wills’. Here, NT does not prevent a causal interaction between mind and
body. Thus, the kind of occasionalism resulting from this view is of
course partial, but this does not imply that it must be inconsistent. Arguably,
in La Forge’s view, this partiality was precisely what made occasionalism
appealing.
Submitted 15 July 2013; revised 11 November; accepted 12 November
University of Groningen
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bardout, Jean-Christoph. ‘Occasionalism: Cordemoy, La Forge, Geulincx’.
In A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, edited by S. Nadler, 140–
51. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.
Clarke, Desmond M. ‘Causal Powers and Occasionalism from Descartes to
Malebranche’. In Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, edited by S.
Gaukroger, J. Schuster, and J. Sutton, 131–48. London: Routledge,
2000.
Clatterbaugh, Kenneth. ‘Cartesian Causality, Explanation, and Divine
Concurrence’. History of Philosophy Quarterly 12, no. 2 (1995): 195–
207.
Descartes, René. Lettres de M. Descartes, où sont traitées les plus belles
questions de la morale, de la physique, de la médecine et des
mathématiques. Published by C. Clerselier, vol. 3. Paris: Charles
Angot, 1667.
Descartes, René. Oeuvres. Edited by C. Adam and P. Tannery, new presen-
tation by J. Beaude, P. Costabel, A. Gabbey, and B. Rochot. 11 vols.
Paris: Vrin, 1964–1974.
Descartes, René. Principles of Philosophy. Translation with explanatory
notes by V. R. Miller and P. Miller. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983 (ried.
Kluwer).
Descartes, René. The Philosophical Writings (vol. 3) – The Correspondence.
Translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, and A. Kenny.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991.
Eaton, William, and Robert Higgerson. ‘Causation and the Cartesian
Reduction of Motion: God’s Role in Grinding the Gears’. In
Causation and Modern Philosophy, edited by K. Allen and T.






























Freddoso, Alfred J. ‘God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes:
Pitfalls and Prospects’. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
67, no. 2 (1994): 131–56.
Garber, Daniel. ‘How God Causes Motion: Descartes, Divine Sustenance,
and Occasionalism’. Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 10 (1987): 567–80.
Garber, Daniel. Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992.
Geulincx, Arnold. Arnoldi Geulincx Antverpiensis Opera Philosophica.
Recognovit J. P. N. Land. 3 vols. Hagae Comitum: Martinus Nijhoff,
1891.
Gousset, Jacob. Causarum Primae et Secundarum realis operatio rationibus
conﬁrmatur, et ab abjectionibus defenditur. De His Apologia ﬁt pro
Renato Des Cartes, Adversus Discipulos ejus Pseudonymos a Jacobo
Gussetio, in Epistola ad Celeb. Dominum Hautecurtium Scripta.
Leovardiae: excudit Franciscus Halma, Ordinibus Frisiae Typographus,
1716.
Hobbes, Thomas. De Corpore. Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Prima.
Edited by K. Schuhmann. Paris: Vrin, 1999.
Kolesnik-Antoine, Delphine. ‘Les occasionalismes en France à l’âge classi-
que. Le « cas » arnaldien’. Revue de métaphysique et de morale 49, no. 1
(2006): 41–54.
Kolesnik-Antoine, Delphine. L’homme certésien. Rennes: PuR, 2009.
Kolesnik-Antoine, Delphine. ‘Les voies du corps. Schuyl, Clerselier, et La
Forge lecteurs de L’Homme de Descartes’. Consecutio Temporum 3,
no. 2 (2012): 118–128. http://www.consecutio.org/2012/02/.
La Forge, Louis de. Treatise on the Human Mind (1664). Translation with an
Introduction and Notes by D. M. Clarke. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997.
Le Grand, Antoine. An Entire Body of Philosophy According to the
Principles of the Famous Renate Des Cartes. London: Richard
Bloom, 1694.
Machamer, Peter, and John McGuire. Descartes’s Changing Mind.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2009.
Nadler, Steven. Occasionalism: Causation among the Cartesians. Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2010.
Ott, Walter. Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy.
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009.
Pessin, Andrew. ‘Does Continuous Creation Entail Occasionalism?
Malebranche (and Descartes)’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30,
no. 3 (2000): 413–39.
Platt, Andrew R. ‘Divine Activity and Motive Power in Descartes’s
Physics’. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19, part I: no.
4 (2011): 623–46; part II: no. 5 (2011): 849–71.
Radner, Dasie. ‘Occasionalism’. In The Renaissance and Seventeenth-
Century Rationalism, edited by G. H. R. Parkinson, 320–52. London:
Routledge, 1993.
Regis, Pierre-Sylvain. Cours entier de philosophie, ou Systeme general selon
les principes de M. Descartes. Amsterdam: aux dépens des Huguetan,
1691.





























Regius, Henricus. Philosophia Naturalis. Amsterdam: Apud Ludovicum
Elzevirium, 1654.
Sangiacomo, Andrea. ‘Dall’origine della superstizione all’origine del movi-
mento: lo strano caso della confutazione tolandiana di Spinoza’. Rivista
di Storia della Filosoﬁa 68, no. 4 (2013): 645–71.
Schmaltz, Tad M. Descartes on Causation. New York: Oxford UP, 2008.
Schmaltz, Tad M. ‘Occasionalism and Mechanism: Fontenelle’s Objections
to Malebranche’. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16, no. 2
(2008): 292–313.
Scribano, Emanuela. Da Descartes a Spinoza. Percorsi della teologia razio-
nale nel Seicento. Milano: Franco Angeli, 1988.
Scribano, Emanuela. ‘Introduzione’. InM. Cureau de la Chambre, Quale sia
la conoscenza degli animali e ﬁn dove possa estendersi, edited by
Emanuela Scribano, 11–49. Pisa: Felici Editore, 2010.
Shapiro, Lisa. The Correspondence Between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia
and René Descartes. Edited and translated by Lisa Shapiro. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2007.
Stirner, Max. The Ego and Its Own. Edited by D. Leopold. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1995.
Toland, John. Letters to Serena. London: Bernard Linton, 1704.
Yakira, Elhanan. La causalité de Galilée à Kant. Paris: Puf, 1994.
80 ANDREA SANGIACOMO
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
ro
nin
ge
n]
 at
 02
:37
 23
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
4 
